What should never be forgotten about Steven Gerrard is that he is worth it. The frustration, the aggravation, the many moments when a manager despairs, it will all be as nothing the day he plays for England as he does for Liverpool.

Not many footballers deserve to have a trophy-winning event named in their honour, but Gerrard does. Stanley Matthews was awarded the 1953 FA Cup Final despite a hat-trick from Stan Mortensen, his Blackpool team-mate, but there is no rival claim to the designation of the 2006 FA Cup Final between Liverpool and West Ham United.

Gerrard, and some naivety on West Ham's part, was the difference that day. He made Liverpool's first goal, scored their second, it was his equaliser from long range that took the game into extra time and his successful penalty in the shoot-out heaped pressure on opponents who were mentally spent. His performance in the 2005 Champions League final against AC Milan pales by comparison because, in that game, his first half was as ordinary as his second half was magnificent.

Liverpool would not have been in Istanbul without him, though. Indeed the club would not have been in the tournament beyond December 8, 2004, when Gerrard's decisive third goal against Olympiacos four minutes from time elevated them to second in group A, behind Monaco, and secured a place in the knockout stages. Until then, the anticlimax of the Uefa Cup beckoned. It is this Gerrard whom England managers visualise when they write his name on the teamsheet, even if he so rarely materialises on the pitch.

For a player, international football is about taking chances. A new boy does not have months to impress or become comfortable with team-mates; he has to make an instant impression. The flip side is that one good performance can merit a show of faith from the manager lasting years. Jermaine Jenas remained in Sven-Göran Eriksson's thoughts until the end on the back of one strong display in a competitive match, when he successfully replaced David Beckham on the right in Azerbaijan in 2004. This process continues. Stewart Downing was given his chance by Fabio Capello, the England manager, against Andorra in Barcelona, did not take it, and has been ignored since. Theo Walcott made an impression almost instantly in the same game, kept his place, was a revelation in Zagreb, and was quickly established.

There are exceptions, however, and Gerrard is one. Had his performance against Kazakhstan on Saturday come from a young central midfield player making his debut, a second chance would not have followed soon. Like Wayne Rooney, however, Gerrard is selected through periods of poor form or uncertainty, because at his best he is a match-winner. If he is feeling his place in the team is in doubt, it is because the dynamic around England's central midfield has been changed by the resurgence of Frank Lampard.

Had Gerrard been available for the game away to Andorra, he would have started in the centre with Gareth Barry and Lampard would have been a substitute. Lampard and Barry had poor games against the Czech Republic in August and Capello believed, having started Gerrard on the left with a licence to roam in the two previous matches at Wembley, that it was time to restore him to the middle. This plan collapsed when Gerrard could not be considered by England because he was to have a groin operation, which had plainly been scheduled to optimum effect by Liverpool. Capello, frustrated at not being party to the decision, was left with no choice but to partner Lampard and Barry again. This time it worked. Lampard was England's best player against Andorra and, required to perform in a more conservative role in Croatia, rose to the challenge again. His club form since has been exceptional.

When Lampard arrived at the England camp last week, it was to be told that he was in the form of his life by one of Capello's lieutenants and, after Saturday's performance against Kazakhstan, in which he outshone Gerrard by some distance, there is little question of who tops Capello's pecking order. The job is Lampard's to lose, in the same way that form alone will not play Michael Owen back into the England squad if his rival, Jermain Defoe, continues to take his chances as expertly as he did coming off the bench on Saturday.

Had Joe Cole been fit, Capello would have had a greater dilemma going into this evening's game against Belarus in Minsk. Without him it seems a very straightforward decision to move Gerrard back to the position he occupied against the United States and the Czech Republic, or even to swap him with Walcott, so that Gerrard starts right and Walcott plays left, as he often does for Arsenal. Yet, if Lampard and Barry stay in form and the central places remain taken, the future for Gerrard should not be a purely nomadic existence, filling in for whichever England player happens to be missing in a match - and there is usually one - because he is so much better than that.

Capello needs to find a way of creating a secure role for Gerrard that will make him as influential as he is for Liverpool. This may not be what would conventionally be regarded as his best position, but if it takes an age to consider, then that is the way it has to be. The one advantage that an international manager has over his club equivalent is thinking time. It would help if Gerrard, and English football, could be persuaded to think beyond straight lines. His statement that he has played only a handful of times for England in his best position - central midfield with a dedicated holding midfield player covering - is the root of the problem.

Gerrard is a better footballer than that. He is a bigger talent than this one-dimensional harum-scarum playground player, who cannot function unless he is given the freedom to chase the ball like an overexcited nine-year-old.

Nobody wants to dampen the ability of a match-winner, but it needs to be established that this can be done wherever he starts in midfield; it does not require the team to be built around him or to function in such a simplistic way. Yet it is hard to admonish Gerrard when the wider philosophies of English football are so similar. On Saturday, Capello started with a 4-3-3 formation and abandoned it at half-time in favour of 4-4-2. Instantly this was pounced upon as proof that England must never again stray from their default game plan.

Capello thought that plan A was not working, changed it, got a good win as a result and credit to him for that; but why should 4-3-3 be abandoned, rather than reshot? It may need more work than four days of training. It may need different personnel. Capello, an enabling manager, may wish to take a longer run at the project next time. Why is this not considered? Why is the consensus that 4-3-3 is fit only for the dump, ditched like the 3-5-2 system Steve McClaren adopted in Croatia, which resulted in another lurch towards orthodoxy?

McClaren came into the job with bold plans to produce an England team who could fluently adapt to different ways of playing throughout the game, but fearfully deserted that ambition after the hostile reception to the 2-0 defeat in Zagreb, where he implemented three at the back with only two days' preparation. With hindsight, McClaren's plan against Croatia was too ambitious, but, even so, goalkeeping and defensive errors for the first goal, not the system, were the prime causes of England's defeat that night.

Sadly, the backlash was so great that McClaren would not countenance experimenting with the formation again. In Russia, a year later, it was discovered in advance of the match that Guus Hiddink, the opposition coach, intended playing three at the back, which would leave England outnumbered in midfield. The best way to counter this is to mirror it, but McClaren's confidence was gone. England stayed as they were and, as the game wore on, Hiddink increasingly front-loaded his team. England struggled to cope and were overrun, losing to two late goals from Roman Pavlyuchenko. Perhaps the England team that McClaren dreamt of creating would have been able to survive, but, after Zagreb, he was too scared to go in pursuit of it.

And, as we are so often told, three at the back is an outdated system that no modern manager considers playing these days. It is what has ruined Bayern Munich under Jürgen Klinsmann. It is a relic, a memory, like a 16-team World Cup or a free kick by Paul Breitner. And here is the funny thing. Chelsea, under Luiz Felipe Scolari, play it. When Scolari first wrote Chelsea's team on the tactics board, to the surprise of his English players, he included John Obi Mikel, not as a holding midfield player, but as a third centre half, with José Bosingwa and Ashley Cole as wing backs. He still does.

All observers, including this one, continue writing Chelsea's formation as having four defenders because when the team line up, that is how they appear, but Scolari, as a manager, sees the true game plan as what unfolds once play is under way. His full backs go forward to act as surrogate wingers and Mikel drops in to guard the defence: three at the back. Versatility is the essence of successful football.

Gerrard seeks freedom on the pitch, but freedom of thought is what English football truly lacks. Gerrard's problems are in the mind. He desperately wants to play well for England, but feels he is limited by not being used in his right position. Technically, he doesn't have one; the greatest players never do. It should not matter if Gerrard starts on the left this evening or in the future. He can win a game from anywhere and must believe that. This is a player with the potential to have a World Cup final named after him one day. That is why he is worth the trouble.